Philosophy and Liberalism (HPS 1*)

In general, important civilizations start with a rigid and superstitious system, gradually relaxed, and leading, at a certain stage, to a period of brilliant genius, while the good of the old tradition remains and the inherent evil in its dissolution has not yet developed. But as the evil unfolds, it leads to anarchy, thence, inevitably, to a new tyranny, producing a new synthesis secured by a new system of dogma. The doctrine of liberalism is an attempt to escape from this endless oscillation. The essence of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community. Whether this attempt can succeed only the future can determine.

Bertrand Russell, A History of Western of Western Philosophy (xxiii)
Bertrand Russell, 1936

As Russell draws his introduction to A History of Western Philosophy (HWP) to a close, his underlying intention becomes clear—in short, he seeks to be one of those who will be, by the judgment of those from some future time, one who successfully defended liberalism against the dual threats of “irrational dogma” and superstition on the one hand and “anarchy” on the other. If done well, philosophy will foster “a way of life” (24) that is able to escape from the “endless oscillation” between dogma and anarchy, but even the best of philosophers can pave the way to either dogma or anarchy. Descartes, for instance, set forth a philosophical approach that challenged the authority of Aristotle, an authority that had approached the status of a dogma by the late Middle Ages—he was, after all, simply referred to as the Philosopher—and turned instead to the authority of one’s own thoughts. It is for this reason that “Modern philosophy,” Russell argues, “begins with Descartes, whose fundamental certainty is the existence of himself and his thoughts, from which the external world is to be inferred” (xxi). Yet Descartes’ very challenge to the dogmatism deriving from Aristotle led in turn to the subjectivism of modern philosophy, whereby “everything is only an emanation of the ego,” and with this “subjectivism in philosophy, anarchism in politics goes hand in hand” (ibid.). It was in this context that liberalism emerged, but liberalism is not assured of continuing. As Russell well knew, given that he wrote A History of Western Philosophy during WWII (1940-3), the threats to liberalism were very real, and hence as he wrote this book there was a very real sense of urgency to Russell’s project. In short, Russell’s history of philosophy is a philosophical defense of liberalism.

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History of/is Philosophy Series

And this is a universal law: a living thing can be healthy, strong, and fruitful only when bounded by a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same time too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine away slowly or hasten to its timely end. Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future – all of them depend, in the case of the individual as of a nation, on the existence of a line dividing the bright and discernible from the unilluminable and dark; on one’s being just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time; on the possession of a powerful instinct for sensing when it is necessary to feel historically and when unhistorically. This, precisely, is the proposition the reader is invited to meditate upon: the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture.” (emphasis in original)

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life”

This semester I will take up Nietzsche’s call to the reader and meditate upon his proposition. In particular, I will explore the possibility that philosophy itself is something to be taken up in a way that is, as Nietzsche put it, “healthy, strong, and fruitful.” If we do this as Nietzsche suggests, moreover, then doing philosophy in this way entails having a feel for the unhistorical and the historical in philosophy, and for when one or the other are necessary or to be avoided. But what precisely is one discerning when they have this feel for the unhistorical and historical in philosophy? In Nietzsche’s essay the cattle grazing before us serve as an introduction to the unhistorical, for the cattle forget what happens immediately after it happens, like the main character in the film Memento. In the case of the cattle, they are incapable of creating new memories, and hence of being historical, and immediately forget what just happened. Leonard, the protagonist from Memento who suffers from anterograde amnesia is also, like the cattle, unable to form new memories or recall what just happened. For Nietzsche these would be examples of the unhistorical, but as he points out, and as is rather obvious for us I would think, being excessively or entirely unhistorical would not serve humans well for we need to find a way to balance the unhistorical with the historical, our capacity to forget and move on (like a goldfish as Ted Lasso would advise) with our capacity to remember and learn from the past.

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Four Problems

In my forthcoming book, An Inquiry into Analytic-Continental Metaphysics: Truth, Relevance, and Reality, I begin with four classic problems in metaphysics. The book unfolds from here, drawing from analytic and continental philosophers along the way, as I develop a metaphysics of problems, inspired by the work of Gilles Deleuze, to address these classic problems in metaphysics. I post the four problems here as a point for possible discussion, and as a basis for blog posts to come.

§1 Problem of the New

What is new, truly new? If we say that some event or phenomenon, A, is truly new, then by what criterion do we make this claim? The most immediate answer appears to be that what is new is unlike anything that preceded it, or there are no phenomena or events prior to A that include or harbor A, for if they did then A would not be truly new but would be simply the explication of what was already implicitly present. The problem of the new may therefore not even be a problem. One could echo the sentiments expressed in the book of Ecclesiastes and resign oneself to the view that ‘what has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun’ (Ecclesiates 1:9 New International Version). If one does accept that there can be something that is truly novel, a reality irreducible to what has preceded it, then we have other problems that come along when one accepts this.

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On Garlic and Magnets

garlic-rawHaving recently read Daryn Lehoux’s wonderful book, What Did the Romans Know? (University of Chicago Press, 2012), I was led to revisit and reconsider a post from some time ago on Latour’s concept of factish. The term factish is a neologism Latour uses to combine ideas that are widely thought to be contradictory – namely, a fact and a fetish. The former refers to a reality that is independent of those who may come to discover facts; the latter is a human construction and is a projection onto objects of our desires, wishes, and hopes. Facts thus correspond to a reality that is what it is regardless of what we think about it; fetishes correspond to realities that are what they are solely because of what we think about them. A factish points to a central claim of Latour’s, and it was this claim that was the subject of the earlier post: namely, to be constructed and to be autonomous are synonymous; or, the more constructed the object, the more real and autonomous it is. This gradation of being more or less constructed, or more or less real, is captured by yet another term of Latour’s – relative existence. Lehoux’s book has reminded me of the importance of this theme.

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Third Dogma and SR

In a recent online debate, Harman defended SR against the charge that it is nothing new, that you can search far and wide for a 20th century philosopher who didn’t believe that there are objects that exist autonomously of whatever conscious access we may have of them. In addition to Read more…