January 2022

Macro- and Microphilosophy

Art historians even nowadays still talk about a “Morellian method.” Let us see of what this method consisted. Museums, Morelli said, are full of paintings whose authorship has been attributed inaccurately. But to restore each painting to its real author is a difficult task: often these works are not signed, have been re-painted or are in bad condition. In such a situation it is indispensable to be able to distinguish between originals and copies. But to do this, Morelli said, one should not work (as is usually done) on the basis of the most striking features of paintings, which for this very reason are the easiest to imitate: the lifted-to-heaven eyes of Perugino’s figures, the smile of Leonardo’s, and so on. One should rather examine the most negligible details, those least influenced by the characteristics of the school the painter belongs to: the lobes of the ears, the fingernails, the shape of the fingers and toes. In this manner Morelli discovered, and painstakingly cataloged, the shape of ears typical of Botticelli, that of Cosmé Tura, and so on: these traits were present in originals, but not in copies.

Carlo Ginzburg, “Clues: Roots of a Scientific Paradigm” (1979)
Sandro Botticelli – self-portrait, from Adoration of the Magi (1475)

In the essay from which this passage is taken, Carlo Ginzburg lays out the theoretical underpinnings of what has come to be called, and largely thanks to Ginzburg’s efforts, microhistory. In particular, Ginzburg adopts what he calls a “semiotic paradigm” (284). As with the Morellian method described above, what this semiotic approach involves is a “deciphering of signs” (281). The earlobes as painted by Botticelli, the clues left behind at a crime scene, or the symptoms a patient presents to their doctor, each are a sign for something else, and something that is the real target of the investigation—determining whether the painting is an original or a forgery, identifying the criminal, or diagnosing the illness. In the context of doing history, Ginzburg has adopted a similar approach. In his book The Cheese and the Worms, for instance, Ginzburg takes up the heresy trial of a 16th century miller, Menocchio. As Ginzburg later describes the perspective one could take of this project, as one that “could have been a simple footnote in a hypothetical monograph on the Protestant Reformation in the Friuli,” and a footnote that Ginzburg transformed into a book” (Ginzburg 2012: 203). Now this footnote, or the “negligible details” of a simple 16th century miller could be taken, on the semiotic paradigm Ginzburg adopts, to be a sign for something else, and in this case the religious beliefs of peasants of the Friuli region. This approach to history has come to be called microhistory.

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By Jeffrey Bell, ago

Philosophy and Liberalism (HPS 1*)

In general, important civilizations start with a rigid and superstitious system, gradually relaxed, and leading, at a certain stage, to a period of brilliant genius, while the good of the old tradition remains and the inherent evil in its dissolution has not yet developed. But as the evil unfolds, it leads to anarchy, thence, inevitably, to a new tyranny, producing a new synthesis secured by a new system of dogma. The doctrine of liberalism is an attempt to escape from this endless oscillation. The essence of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community. Whether this attempt can succeed only the future can determine.

Bertrand Russell, A History of Western of Western Philosophy (xxiii)
Bertrand Russell, 1936

As Russell draws his introduction to A History of Western Philosophy (HWP) to a close, his underlying intention becomes clear—in short, he seeks to be one of those who will be, by the judgment of those from some future time, one who successfully defended liberalism against the dual threats of “irrational dogma” and superstition on the one hand and “anarchy” on the other. If done well, philosophy will foster “a way of life” (24) that is able to escape from the “endless oscillation” between dogma and anarchy, but even the best of philosophers can pave the way to either dogma or anarchy. Descartes, for instance, set forth a philosophical approach that challenged the authority of Aristotle, an authority that had approached the status of a dogma by the late Middle Ages—he was, after all, simply referred to as the Philosopher—and turned instead to the authority of one’s own thoughts. It is for this reason that “Modern philosophy,” Russell argues, “begins with Descartes, whose fundamental certainty is the existence of himself and his thoughts, from which the external world is to be inferred” (xxi). Yet Descartes’ very challenge to the dogmatism deriving from Aristotle led in turn to the subjectivism of modern philosophy, whereby “everything is only an emanation of the ego,” and with this “subjectivism in philosophy, anarchism in politics goes hand in hand” (ibid.). It was in this context that liberalism emerged, but liberalism is not assured of continuing. As Russell well knew, given that he wrote A History of Western Philosophy during WWII (1940-3), the threats to liberalism were very real, and hence as he wrote this book there was a very real sense of urgency to Russell’s project. In short, Russell’s history of philosophy is a philosophical defense of liberalism.

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By Jeffrey Bell, ago

History of/is Philosophy Series

And this is a universal law: a living thing can be healthy, strong, and fruitful only when bounded by a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same time too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine away slowly or hasten to its timely end. Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future – all of them depend, in the case of the individual as of a nation, on the existence of a line dividing the bright and discernible from the unilluminable and dark; on one’s being just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time; on the possession of a powerful instinct for sensing when it is necessary to feel historically and when unhistorically. This, precisely, is the proposition the reader is invited to meditate upon: the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture.” (emphasis in original)

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life”

This semester I will take up Nietzsche’s call to the reader and meditate upon his proposition. In particular, I will explore the possibility that philosophy itself is something to be taken up in a way that is, as Nietzsche put it, “healthy, strong, and fruitful.” If we do this as Nietzsche suggests, moreover, then doing philosophy in this way entails having a feel for the unhistorical and the historical in philosophy, and for when one or the other are necessary or to be avoided. But what precisely is one discerning when they have this feel for the unhistorical and historical in philosophy? In Nietzsche’s essay the cattle grazing before us serve as an introduction to the unhistorical, for the cattle forget what happens immediately after it happens, like the main character in the film Memento. In the case of the cattle, they are incapable of creating new memories, and hence of being historical, and immediately forget what just happened. Leonard, the protagonist from Memento who suffers from anterograde amnesia is also, like the cattle, unable to form new memories or recall what just happened. For Nietzsche these would be examples of the unhistorical, but as he points out, and as is rather obvious for us I would think, being excessively or entirely unhistorical would not serve humans well for we need to find a way to balance the unhistorical with the historical, our capacity to forget and move on (like a goldfish as Ted Lasso would advise) with our capacity to remember and learn from the past.

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By Jeffrey Bell, ago

Analytic Philosophy’s Chess Paradigm

Analytic Philosophy has thus a double function: it provides quiet green pastures for intellectual analysis, wherein its practitioners can find refuge from a troubled world and cultivate their intellectual games with chess-like indifference to its course; and it is also a keen, shining sword helping to dispel irrational beliefs and to make evident the structure of ideas

Ernest Nagel, “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe” (1936)

I pass, finally, to the remaining Part of the Ethics, which concerns the means, or way, leading to Freedom. Here, then, I shall treat of the power of reason, showing what it can do against the affects, and what Freedom of Mind, or blessedness, is. From this we shall see how much more the wise man can do than the ignorant. But it does not pertain to this investigation to show how the intellect must be perfected, or in what way the Body must be cared for, so that it can perform its function properly. The former is the concern of Logic, and the latter of Medicine

Spinoza, Ethics 5 Preface
Fischer vs. Spassky in Reykjavik (1972)

Following in the spirit of Nagel’s “impressions” of analytic philosophy, let me begin with an impression I have long had about analytic philosophy—put simply, the hierarchical ladder of success for analytic philosophers seems to favor those who are good puzzle solvers, or more precisely those who were or are mathematical and/or chess prodigies who have turned their sights to doing philosophy instead. As an impression I am making no solid claims to the accuracy of my observation, but I decided to write this blog post after having recently read (admittedly late to it) Liam Kofi Bright’s blog post where he claims analytic philosophy is a degenerating research programme. This also brought to mind a number of blog posts from the NewAPPS days with Eric Schliesser (here, here, and here). With these caveats, I’ll throw out a few comments as to why I agree that analytic philosophy was destined to degenerate from the start, and precisely because it sought, as Nagel approvingly observed, “find refuge from a troubled world and cultivate their intellectual games with chess-like indifference to its course…”

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By Jeffrey Bell, ago